Law and the Moral Life by Elshtain, Jean Bethke
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities
Volume 11 | Issue 2 Article 4
January 1999
Law and the Moral Life
Jean Bethke Elshtain
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh
Part of the History Commons, and the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Yale
Journal of Law & the Humanities by an authorized editor of Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
julian.aiken@yale.edu.
Recommended Citation
Jean B. Elshtain, Law and the Moral Life, 11 Yale J.L. & Human. (1999).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh/vol11/iss2/4
Symposium
Legal Scholarship in the Humanities: The
View from Inside the Quadrangle
t
Law and the Moral Life
Jean Bethke Elshtain*
Let me begin with a story from the trenches. On a public radio
call-in program in the thick of the Clinton impeachment imbroglio, I
found myself being bombarded with denunciations from irate
citizens. Most callers seemed to believe I was either a member of the
"Christian Right" or part of a "vast right-wing conspiracy" because I
claimed that there had been just a bit wanting in the President's
behavior as President in the conduct of the Lewinsky scandal. Most
importantly, from an ethical perspective, the President made ill use
of so many people: His secretary, staff, Cabinet officers, trusted
t Papers Delivered at a panel organized by Professor Andrew Kull, Emory University, at
the 1999 AALS conference in New Orleans, Louisiana.
* Laura Spelman Rockefeller Professor of Social and Political Ethics at the University of
Chicago.
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advisers, and even his wife were all called upon to lie on his behalf
and in the interest of such a low matter. Clearly, something
interesting had happened in the body politic when activities of this
sort, occurring in the most public place in the country-the White
House-and in the office "part" (not the residence "part"), are
covered automatically by a claim to "privacy." "Our laws protect
privacy," one riled-up citizen proclaimed, "and what you want to do
would legislate morality. You are talking about morality, not law.
Law and morality need to be kept separate." Wishing I had never
agreed to be a part of what had turned into an over-the-airwaves
drubbing, I queried: "Well, what, then is morality to you?" Answer:
"It has to do with whatever people think is right or wrong." Ah-ha,
think I, he's got himself tangled up on this one, and I shot back: "So
law and morality have nothing to do with one another. The law never
speaks to moral questions. Would you like to try making that case to
Dr. Martin Luther King?" Initial silence from caller, then a heated
"Why don't you let me finish?" At that point the referee, otherwise
known as the host, jumped in and did one of those above-the-fray
type of riffs: "Well, now, Professor Elshtain, the caller certainly does
have a point. Are we really in the business of legislating morality?"
Says I: "We do it all the time."
I didn't go on to point out to my radio-land interlocutor the fact
that there are presently dominant schools and tendencies within
American legal scholarship whose practitioners share the caller's
view of the matter. The reactions run from outright cynicism and
denunciation of rule by law as nothing but a "cover" for naked
power relations, to a view of the law as purely instrumental, which is
a different sort of radical "devaluing" of law. Such trends and
tendencies have been around for a long time. For those of us who
came of age in the 1960s, blasting law as "nothing but" a cover for
privilege or a sexist tool or some other awful thing was common
everyday sport. Today, those everyday bits and pieces of ideology
have coalesced into several powerful strands in contemporary legal
thinking and jurisprudence: the law and economics school and the
feminist school.
We do it all the time. But do we? This is a controversial claim
whether in or out of law schools, in a day and age in which we are
invited to bracket moral claims by seeing them as entirely subjective,
not open to reasoned defense or adjudication. I don't have in mind a
strenuous Kantianism; rather, I approach these matters from a realist
epistemology. This involves the conviction that there are truths to be
discerned, to be made known and manifest, and to be honored
insofar as frail human beings can live up to certain standards. These
truths help to constitute norms that may themselves be overridden or
violated under certain conditions. The moral realist recognizes that
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truth as embodied in human institutions-and the law is one such
institution-can never achieve perfection. Such perfection will
always elude us, given that the way we come to know the truth and
try to write it into law is bound to be epistemically flawed, as our
minds are imperfect instruments. The implication of this latter
recognition is that laws are not writ in stone but alterable over time
as new recognitions dawn that either deepen prior normative
commitments or put pressure upon them. A given law might not
reflect as it should upon the truths we have come to understand
about human beings, the sorts of creatures they are, and the kind of
treatment that should be theirs simply by virtue of their humanness.
With these all-too-brief comments, I simply want to get across the
notion that the law always imbeds a philosophy within itself and that
philosophy, in turn, exudes moral norms, truths, or values. To
describe the law professor as an ethical and moral philosopher of
sorts is to state a fact-of-the-matter if one operates from the
beginning point of moral realism. From that starting point, law is
never "merely" procedural, because one cannot devise neutral rules
about how people are to live together, by which I mean procedures
that are themselves neutral and neutral as to outcome. From the
"proceduralist" view, studied indifference to, or acquiescence in,
whatever derives from the extant framework provided by rules that
are more or less neutral is no intrinsic problem. That's just the way
the cookie crumbles. Procedural norms are not to be violated. But
that "not" is not itself a moral claim, or the legal embodiment of one;
it is merely a practical requirement when groups of people live
together who are not guided by any prior and binding sets of moral
or ethical requirements. It follows, on this view, that it is not the
business of law to evaluate the good life or to make judgments as
between more or less desirable ways of life. The law professor as
philosopher and ethicist in this framework does not have much
heavy lifting to do. Perhaps he or she would be called upon from
time to time to engage in a bit of frenetic sifting and winnowing of
the "fair" procedures from possibly unfair ones that violate the
commitment to neutrality. But beyond that there is not much work
to do.
Many both inside and outside the law find this an incoherent way
to go about things. Why? Because, they argue, procedures
themselves exude a normative content: They can never be merely
1. This gestures to what might be called the "anthropological turn" in social and political
and ethical thought, namely, the dual recognition that one cannot bracket ontological
commitments indefinitely, as the epistemological turn would have it, and that the so-called
linguistic turn, in its many forms of representation, has finally pretty much exhausted itself. We
are back to consideration of the human itself. For a recent example of the "anthropological
turn" in law, see MICHAEL PERRY, THE IDEA OF HUMAN RIGHTS (1998).
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neutral. Because law is by definition a moral force, one can rightly
put ethical and moral questions to the law and expect ethical and
moral answers. This means that law is inevitably implicated in what
philosopher Charles Taylor calls a particular "value slope."2 You
don't have to be committed to a strong version of natural law or
natural right to make this argument and to hold this view. If this is
the tack one takes, it becomes exigent to evaluate the "real world"
outcomes that particular laws either make possible or foreclose.
Tricky questions follow: Does my approach entail an attempt to
blanket the social, political, and economic world with dense
normativity under cover of law? Or is there a normative framework
within which we (and the law) operate that leaves open many
multiple and plural possibilities?
My challenge is to respond to these and other vital queries. I will
do so by arguing on behalf of the law as a form of moral thinking,
with the basic "stuff" of law-the much-derided (presently, at any
rate) basic facts and data, or descriptions of the world-serving as
the very heart of the law's moral and philosophical enterprise, an
enterprise the law professor as philosopher is in the best position to
respect and to transmit as a certain habit of thinking.' Part of what is
involved in this perspective is the vital importance of upholding
humble truths.
What does it say about a society that prides itself on being a
"nation of laws" yet tells lawyer jokes relentlessly -jokes that make
the lawyer look like a vicious, untrustworthy, ambitious Machiavel
who will stop at nothing to get a client "off the hook," whether the
hook is premeditated double-homicide or a parking ticket. (Law
professors probably wouldn't be that much higher on the scale in the
minds of Jane and John Q. Public.)
A second report from the trenches: In 1992, I was in
Czechoslovakia with a small group of political philosophers, and we
had the opportunity to meet with President Viclav Havel. It was just
at the point that the two republics were about to divide: Slovakia had
already proclaimed its separation, and the Czech parliament was
about to vote on a measure that would make the division final.
Despite all of this, no constitution was being drafted. Havel told us,
with a note of both frustration and humor, that he had a plan to lock
a group of constitutional lawyers up somewhere and to tell them they
couldn't get out before they had a draft of a workable document. It
2. Charles Taylor, Neutrality in Political Science, in PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS, AND SOCIETY
25 (Peter Laslett & W.G. Rununian eds., 3d ser. 1967).
3. When I speak of "facts" here I do not have in mind those bits and pieces of social
science information generated by mainstream empiricist practices and assumptions-"brute-
data identifiable" in Charles Taylor's words. CHARLES TAYLOR, Interpretation and the
Sciences of Man, in 2 PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 58,58 (1985).
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was amusing, but from the American perspective, it was a terrifying
prospect indeed. Trust lawyers with a constitution? Whoever heard
of such a shocking possibility?
I was back in the by-then Czech Republic in 1993 as an "academic
guide" and arranged for my group to meet with President Havel's
brother, Ivan, to discuss the situation in the fledgling republic. Ivan
Havel gave us a splendid run-down of the daunting prospects that lay
ahead. And then he said, quite seriously, "What we especially need
are lawyers. Many more lawyers." The good people from the United
States arrayed before him broke out into semi-hysterical laughter.
"Take a bunch of ours," one shouted, "in fact take all of them!"
Havel turned to me and I explained that the reputation of lawyers
was not high among us and that lawyers were seen as representing
many of the worst features of American life: narrowly legalistic;
encouraging some to sue at the drop of a hat; trying to get others off
the hook by hook and crook; mounting forms of defense that left too
few accountable for their actions; charging extortionist fees; and nit-
picking each and every issue to death in ways that defy common
sense. I told him that, of course, these were exaggerations and
stereotypes, but that lawyers had nonetheless come to earn such a
reputation as a species or collectivity. He smiled and said, "Well,
what I hear tells me I probably don't want your lawyers, then."
How did the reputation of the law fall so low among us? 'Twas not
always so. Let's take up, briefly, one very famous example drawn
from Alexis de Tocqueville's masterwork, Democracy in America!
Tocqueville introduces his comments about juries and the rule of law
in -America with his famous discussion of "The Omnipotence of the
Majority in the United States and its Effects."' He frets at length
about a kind of sacralization of majority sentiment, one that goes so
far among Americans as to apply the "theory of equality" to brains -
as if no person could be wiser, more intelligent, or better informed
than any other.6 This leads to a short political fuse. Americans want
their legislators to hold brief terms of office so that representatives
are more likely to be dominated not only by the general views held
by their constituents but by their "passing passions" as well.' The
growing omnipotence of the majority heightens the problems
inherent in democracies. The "germ of tyranny" lies imbedded in
such omnipotence, and may gain "irresistible strength."' The results
4. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (J.P. Mayer ed. & George
Lawrence trans., Harper Perennial 1988) (1835).
5. Id. at 246.
6. Id. at 247.
7. Id. at 246. -
8. Id. at 252.
1999]
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are various forms of "despotism" by legislators or even magistrates.'
It's a pretty gloomy set of prospects, all in all.
But Tocqueville also believes that there are forces that temper the
tyranny of the majority. Primus inter pares in this regard is the legal
profession, a noble vocation that serves a counterbalancing role to
democracy's worst tendencies and most dangerous excesses. Where
the majority may want to speak in unison, with no dissenting voice to
be heard, there will be the ballast of the legal profession,
democracy's own aristocrats and the "strongest barriers against" its
faults." Of course, lawyers may "yield to sudden and temporary
impulses," but, on the whole, they are more or less obedient "to
constantly recurring instincts natural to them."" And what are these?
A concern with proper order and formalities as a way to achieve a
certain distance from the tumult. An "instinctive love for a regular
concatenation of ideas" that puts them at odds with revolutionary
cataclysms and "the ill-considered passions of democracy" alike. 2
The lawyer's years of study and special knowledge have bred in him
(her now, too, of course) an intimate "feel" for a complex "science"
and a responsibility for moving litigants from "blind passions"
toward reasonable objectives. 3
Lawyers form a kind of epistemic community. They do not agree
across the board "but common studies and like methods link their
intellects."' 4 It is unsurprising, then, to find them in the leading ranks
of all free governments. So the lawyer is simultaneously "one of the
people" and, given his learned habits, a kind of aristocrat. He serves
therefore as a "natural liaison officer between aristocracy and the
people," a "mixture of the legal and democratic minds" without
whom democracy cannot last long." If democracy goes off the deep
end in any direction, the special mediating, deliberating, and probing
quality of the lawyer's contributions to a well-governed and balanced
democratic order will be forfeit. The lawyer taps reasoning powers so
that when people "get intoxicated by their passions" lawyers can
slow things down. 6 This is of special, indeed momentous, concern to
the American republic because the United States is a society in
which sooner or later nearly every political question becomes a
judicial one. 7 Legal language drifts into common speech along with
9. Id. at 690.
10. Id. at 263.




15. Id. at 266.
16. Id. at 268.
17. See id. at 270.
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the deliberative habits (much watered down, of course) that
constitute the law.
18
But there are those occasions when a jury is needed, and this
affords the opportunity for the jury-above all a political institution
representing the sovereignty of the people-to show that its
members, too, can embody habits of the judicial mind as they go
about their important business. In this way the jury system helps to
spread respect for court decisions-a critical element indeed, for
"[1]aws are always unsteady when unsupported by mores; mores are
the only tough and durable power in a nation."'9 If respect for court
decisions diminishes, the idea of right will constrict as well. And
were those two elements to be lost altogether, then love of
independence becomes just a destructive passion that recognizes no
natural barrier. The jury is a
free school which is always open and in which each juror learns
his rights, comes into daily contact with the best-educated and
most-enlightened members of the upper classes, and is given
practical lessons in the law, lessons which the advocate's efforts,
the judge's advice, and the very passions of the litigants bring
within his mental grasp.'
My undergraduate students find these passages from Tocqueville
nearly unintelligible. Jury duty is what you try to get out of. Juries
are always swayed by irrational appeals, in part, because it is
passions and animus and emotion to which the lawyers play in order
to get their clients off or to win huge sums in tort claims or in some
other, usually dubious, cause. Lawyers, the aristocrats, helping us to
stand somewhat above the fray so that the law might have room to
work? You've got to be kidding! Lawyers pander to the mob
mentality, they don't oppose it. That's a pretty fair summary of how
things tend to go. But it is incomplete. The students in class who
come from recent immigrant backgrounds are far more appreciative
of the special role, even nobility, here assigned to law. A few of them
come from backgrounds ravaged by lawlessness -whether societies
in chaos or societies strangled by an excess of order where law
clearly served no purpose other than to help the powerful remain so.
These students believe in the rule of law. But they wonder what
happened to it if the "American" kids (those whose families have
been here several generations, or more) seem so cynical about its
operation.
This survey of our discontents has been to a purpose. Over the
past several decades, even as law professors have made various
18. See id.
19. Id. at 274.
20. Id. at 275.
1999]
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"turns" (econometric, literary, linguistic, feminist, post-structuralist,
post-modern), our mores have been slowly but surely drained of
what was, at one time, sturdier content about the rule of law and the
fact of law as we understood it then: namely, that no person was
either above or below any other in the eyes of the law." We once
told stories of the law's corruption in hushed or outraged tones: This
shouldn't go on, not here in America. The rich shouldn't be able to
buy their way out of trouble or have the law bent on their behalf; the
poor shouldn't find themselves altogether without its benefits. These
things are wrong and should be brought to the attention of the
necessary parties, and something should be done about it. There
oughta be a law when law isn't working!
At this point a predictable riposte will emerge, something along
the lines of reading back through rose-colored lenses and finding a
law-governed utopia in the past. In fact, argue contemporary cynics,
everything was always pretty much rotten. The difference is that
now, armed with sundry comprehensive theories and privileged
epistemologies, we're smart enough to realize that the patina
surrounding law was always an "emotive" thing, a kind of
sentimental attachment. This attachment arises, in part, as a reaction
to the increasing inclusion of traditionally excluded groups, a
nostalgia for a simpler time before all sorts of folks who don't "think
like us" (including women, in some arguments) got "into the system"
and began to use it for their purposes just as it had always been used
by others. Rather than making an immediate counter-argument, I
will frame matters by parsing the classic film Twelve Angry Men22
while Tocqueville's discussion of the law and the jury is still fresh in
our minds.
Twelve Angry Men was a product of the liberal consensus that
dominated American life at the time. Made in 1957, it was the screen
version of a play by Reginald Rose, who, along with director Sidney
Lumet and star Henry Fonda, favored left-wing causes. (I mention
this because the position the film articulates, if presented "cold,"
might in fact come under fire as a piece of "conventionalist"
propaganda in our present context.) The jurors are locked in. The
room is hot. One guy wants to cry "guilty" as soon as possible
because he has tickets to the ball game that night. Another begins an
21. It goes without saying that the execution of these principles was all too frequently
wanting. But strong commitment to the general normative principles involved remained, at
least until the past few decades-decades that have witnessed all manner of upheaval, much of
it not to the good, including cynicism as a kind of American growth industry. For a discussion
of how law as an institution of civil society fares at present, see COUNCIL ON CIVIL SOCIETY,
INSTITUTE FOR AMERICAN VALUES, A CALL TO CIVIL SOCIETY (1997); and NATIONAL
COMMISSION ON CIVIL RENEWAL, A NATION OF SPECTATORS (1997).
22. TWELVE ANGRY MEN (MGM 1957).
390
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outraged riff against kids running wild these days. The case is a
murder charge against a young man of Hispanic or Puerto Rican
background (we don't hear his name but we do glimpse his
frightened face as the jurors leave the courtroom to begin their
deliberations.) A straw vote is called for (eleven to one, guilty).
Groans. Who is the lone jerk holding out? The drama begins. A
foreman is selected and nearly two hours of intense dialogue and
deliberation ensue.
What the Fonda character-for he is the holdout-first tries to do
is to get his fellow jurors to imagine the defendant's life. Broken
home, filthy neighborhood, beatings every day. His major antagonist
screams, we need to slap down a kid who would raise his hand
against his father. Fonda listens to everyone else screaming how sure
they are of his guilt. Slowly, he begins to raise some doubts. Consider
the possibility of error and misjudgment. People can make mistakes
in identifying someone. Is the case-the circumstantial case, the trail
of evidence-as solid as it appears? If we're going to send a man to
the chair, we'd better be sure that's where he belongs.
Yeah, well, suppose we let a murderer off, a juror opines. No one
wants to do that either, replies Fonda. Another juror, level-headed
but voting guilty, argues with the group, many of whom harbor their
own doubts, on the grounds of the evidence. He points out, and no
one disagrees, that "the facts are at stake, not the kind of boy he is."
And it is finally facts-what could have happened, what could not
possibly have happened-that decide the issue: how knives are held
in a knife fight; the deep grooves around the bridge of a nose
indicating years of eye-spectacle use, hence a key state witness
couldn't possibly have had hers on at the time she claims a positive
I.D., and so on. The discussion is set up in such a way that a man who
speaks with an accent and is clearly a relative newcomer to our
shores talks about "responsibility," the "remarkable thing about
democracy," and how the "jury is part of that." Even the man
screaming about a "lousy bunch of bleeding hearts and rotten kids"
comes around in the end, his bias overcome by the slow, dawning
recognition that the defendant could not have killed his father. The
circumstantial and physical evidence against him just doesn't add up.
Of course, the film is a setup: The men we like best are also the
best men. That aside, in 1957 this was not only great drama with a
great cast, it also embodied the liberal position that the law cannot
be swept aside in haste or from prejudice. Patience and deliberation
are the heart of the matter, with the facts carrying weight against our
prejudices. We should let the argument be borne by what we can
determine has happened, or has happened in a certain way, to the
very best of our flawed human capacities. Twelve Angry Men
powerfully reinforces this liberal view. It is a view that needs
1999]
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defenders again, especially in the institutions that mold those who
will be on the front-line of the law-the lawyers.
So let's take a look at two prevalent approaches to the law in order
to assess whether or not "the rule of law" is here sustained or in
some way (perhaps inadvertently) undermined. I will focus on
examples drawn from law and economics and feminist/race/critical
legal scholarship-the economistic and feminist "turns." First,
however, a caveat: Great insights have been derived from these
turns. Long overdue attention has been focused on problems
involving women and social justice and probing questions have been
raised concerning what the law has generally presumed as average or
modal in all circumstances. Similarly, the law and economics
movement has shown us the need to grapple with the pervasiveness
of human economic activity. Much of law, after all, is about
regularizing the ownership and transmission of property in various
forms. A problem emerges, however, when a legal scholar offers
these turns as comprehensive ideology rather than insights, often
cast in the language of very high theory. The presumption seems to
be that the law, by not offering a comprehensive ideology itself, must
be in need of one. The results, criticized below, show what happens
when one or two insights are inflated and taken for the whole.
What is forgotten, in such instances, is the moral standing of the
law as practiced every day in America's courtrooms. There are, in
other words, arguments to be made that law professors are in an
ideal position to make-arguments having to do with the stubborn
integrity of relevant facts played out on the ground, so to speak, not
on an abstract plane. If they do not undertake this task, who will?
The answer, of course, is that the task of defending moral
propositions and principles is overtaken increasingly by neo-Kantian
philosophers or post-structuralists who aim to undermine the neo-
Kantian enterprise. Neither of these approaches, framed in relation
to one another, captures the distinctive quality of the moral
reasoning imbedded in and constitutive of the law or what we loosely
call the rule of law. This, however, is a case that must be made and
not merely claimed. Let us move to the economistic turn for
illustrative purposes.
Law and economics is a powerful force at present, and for good
reason. A potent, elegant theory (in its defenders' inevitable terms of
encomium) lies behind it: neo-market economics and the whole
panoply of curves and laws and formulae that make it up. Echoing
Sean Connery from The Untouchables, what does it mean to "do
10
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things the Chicago way?"' It means that all of life is viewed through
the prism of utility maximization. If we all maximize utility,
outcomes will be "optimized" and everybody will benefit, at least
somewhat. You may be a loser relative to others but if enough
people are winning and the "outcome" - a rather mysterious
aggregate-shows a plus on the ledger, then things are better overall,
even if each individual might not be better off in any absolute sense.
The underlying anthropological presuppositions of the theory are
that human beings are isolates driven by preferences. If people ever
act "altruistically" (and the only options are "selfish"-or normal-
and "altruistic" -or supererogatory) it is because they have made a
calculation that such behavior will be to their own benefit.
Bear in mind that money or income isn't the central objective-
maximizing satisfaction is -and every individual is the sole source of
his or her own choices. 4 The problem with an overarching theory of
the microeconomic sort is that once all is reduced to a market model
of the person, other ways of thinking are excluded. This theory
includes the belief that consumers maximize perceived utilities-
always-although perfect information of the sort that would be
necessary to reach the Holy Grail of ideal choice is never literally
available. Human beings are about tastes and preferences. All else is
reckoned as an "externality." Citizenship fades into consumerism as
well, for it is all about maximizing utilities. The paradigm form of
such utility maximization has to do with markets, goods,
consumables, and so on.
Here is the problem when this mode of reasoning shifts over into
the legal realm: It encourages what I will call crude substitution.
Some people maximize income. Others may find utility in children so
the child is a "substitute" for material things. "If reading the Bible
gives you a considerable amount of satisfaction or utility, maximizing
utility will include spending time to read the Bible. If going to church
gives you utility, you are likely to go to church with some
frequency."' On and on in this fashion. One can see in all of this a
23. THE UNTOUCHABLES (Paramount 1987).
24. The criticisms I make here by no means diminish the accomplishments of the market.
Robert Kuttner, in his important book, EVERYTHING FOR SALE: THE VIRTUES AND LIMITS
OF MARKETS (1998), marvels at the extraordinary energy unleashed by market economies.
Indeed the market's virtues help to account for why communism failed so miserably. In
addition to trampling civil liberties and laughing cynically at political democracy, communism
destroyed the price system. Inefficiencies piled up in a grotesque manner. Shoddy goods
couldn't reach desperate consumers. Shortages mounted. Pollution soared. The whole thing
finally collapsed of its own weight. But an entirely free market is no day at the beach either.
25. This is a point I owe to Professor D. Gale Johnson, of the Department of Economics at
the University of Chicago who, in criticizing my views on econometric theorizing, offered up
additional examples that I found grist for the mill. I do not want to associate him in any way
with the position I am here taking. I do, however, want to credit him with deepening my
understanding of how this all works.
1999]
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version of utilitarianism which favors reductionisms of a sort that
remove the recognition and requirement that much of the moral life
is about weighing and sifting goods and establishing priorities of the
more and less important.
How we go about prioritizing is inherently complex and turns on
the richness of the presuppositions with which we begin. These
presuppositions in turn yield descriptions of specific situations.
Remember my earlier point: There is no such thing as mere
description of any situation. Description is always from a point of
view and hence evaluative. We describe situations on the basis of
those aspects that we deem relevant or important. In this way, we
"always evaluate under a certain description."26 Econometric ways of
thinking, like behaviorism and utilitarianism before it, impoverish
the world of description, omitting facts that are morally and, I will
later argue, legally relevant.
For example: Robert Kuttner, in his book Everything for Sale, cites
an article by Guido Calabresi and A. Douglas Melamed that indicts
slavery by branding it economically inefficient.27 Slavery, for the
article's authors, was inefficient not only for slaves but also for
observers of slavery who suffered from economists describe as
"uncompensated third party effects," and this latter is reckoned as an
"externality" that weighs against slavery as an institution.' Note well
that any feelings of sadness, moral outrage, or even moral
queasiness, get lumped together as "uncompensated third party
effect[s]." Given this description, the course that follows is to claim
that, at some point, the costs-the inefficiencies -mount up and
slavery must collapse. One doesn't have to be William Lloyd
Garrison to find something suspect about this description of slavery.
The problem is not external to economistic theory, but at its very
core-the inability of thinkers operating within the "econometric
paradigm" to get certain basic facts right, to try to look at all the
relevant features of a situation. In other words, the theory fails to
describe complex phenomena adequately and accurately-a task that
I believe is a first responsibility of that mode of reasoning I wish to
associate with the law.29
26. JULIUS KOvEsI, MORAL NOTIONS 151 (1967).
27. See KUTrNER, supra note 24, at 50, (citing Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed,
Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability, 85 HARV. L. REv. 1089 (1972)).
28. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 27, at 1112.
29. And, I should add, with moral thinking in general. Moral thinking is a mode of
practical reason, not simply or merely a technique. To embrace it does not commit one to a
strong version of, say, Aristotelian "virtue" theory, although it does involve some attunement
to habituation in a more Augustinian sense. Augustine has a far more compelling and powerful
theory of akrasia, or weakness of the will, than Aristotle. Why is this important? Precisely to
avoid moral rigorism and narrow moralisms. See JEAN BETHKE ELSHTAIN, AUGUSTINE AND
THE LIMITS OF POLITICS 49 (1996).
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Let me clarify by drawing on examples from a related enterprise -
political science-a discipline that has been profoundly affected by
"rational choice" theory. The way for the economistic turn in the
study of politics was paved by the earlier triumph of a mode of
reasoning called "behaviorism."30 Behaviorism began with the
conviction that human behavior was a relatively reliable variable that
could be worked up into a scientific hypothesis. The idea was that an
aggregate of human beings, exposed to a particular external force,
would react and behave in more or less predictable ways. The
explicit aim was not to offer the richest and thickest possible
description of what was actually going on in a complex political
situation, but to strip away all the apparent complexities so that one
might engage in a search for the underlying laws or regularities at
work. Resonant themes and issues that didn't fit within the frame of
the analysis were either expunged from view or incorporated so as to
fit within the explanation.
Here we get to the heart of the matter: Within the epistemological
presumptions of behaviorist political science, to describe and to
evaluate-to state what is and what ought to be-are two entirely
separable activities. Those who mix the two are fuzzy-minded,
impressionistic, incapable of rigorous analysis. The behaviorist
presents us with one sort of entity, a brute fact to which the analyst,
if she so chooses, can append evaluation, defined as values, biases,
attitudes, and emotional preferences or subjective dimensions. In
this schema, a fact is what Charles Taylor calls brute-data
identifiable behavior.31 For example, putting an X in a square next to
a name on a sheet of paper that is then put into a box and later
counted along with all other such papers is something we call
voting.32 Imprecisions, ambiguities, and ambivalences are ruled out in
advance. More importantly, complex descriptions of any given
human activity are eliminated as the activity, reduced to behavior, is
shorn of all "inessentials," including the historic, political, and social
situation in which it takes place. When one is forced to describe
events in this way, much of what is called a fact, including that which
helps to constitute the fact (as opposed to some "subjective"
appendage to the fact) is eliminated. When this happens, facts are
reduced to brute data and can no longer serve as a source of
30. For a full discussion of behaviorism through representative thinkers and claims, see
JEAN BETHKE ELSHTAIN, Methodological Sophistication and Conceptual Confusion, in REAL
POLITICS AT THE CENTER OF EVERYDAY LIFE 12 (1997).
31. See TAYLOR, supra note 3, at 58.
32. The theory of meaning at work here is that the relationship that pertains between
subject and predicate, which has been established via correlations, exhausts meaning. See, for
example, the work of Charles Taylor that helped break the methodological logjam in the social
sciences. See Charles Taylor, Interpretation and the Sciences of Man, 26 REV. METAPHYSICS 4
(1971); Taylor, supra note 2.
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necessary moral and ethical information.
Let's return to the favorite example of one generation of political
scientists devoted to the utilitarian/positivist framework: the vote. A
vote, according to those who embraced this view, is a physical piece
of behavior that eventuates in an aggregate outcome that allows one
interest to take precedence over another. But suppose I am voting in
an election in which one candidate has clearly stated his racist views,
intentions, and plans. His party's platform claims that Jews are a
blight on the purity of the body politic and would, if he and his party
were victorious, be eliminated by any means necessary. Opposition
parties attack this proposition with various degrees of vigor, some
because such a plan of elimination is impracticable even if desirable;
others because such anti-Semitism violates fundamental norms of
human decency and respect for the dignity of persons that they
would agree must ground any political order that aspires to decency.
This relevant information distinguishes this campaign from a run-of-
the-mill election. What was construed loosely as a citizen's
responsibility (by most civic thinkers, as opposed to behaviorists,
who would talk of maximizing interests or utility) now rises to a
higher level, a different plateau. We ask: What are the relevant facts
that make this situation morally different? To answer this, one would
have to look at the alternatives, the stakes, the principles that are in
peril, and so on.
The point for now is that this situation could either be described
from a moral point of view or not, and that this point of view turns
on what are construed as the relevant facts. I suspect that for many, a
citizen's obligation to vote would be greater since the situation I
have described here turns this act of voting into a moral, legal, and
political decision of the greatest possible moment.33 In the words of
Julius Kovesi:
Situations are not out there in the world, existing independently
of us, so that human beings could just step in and out of them.
Situations are not like puddles that we can step in and out of; to
be in a situation is to be related to other human beings in a
certain way.'
At this point, we can assume a fundamental commitment to a set of
presuppositions about the nature of persons as creatures who are not
to be tortured, wantonly slaughtered, or eliminated by any means
necessary. Otherwise, voting in the situation I described would not
33. The notion of a "situation" I draw from Julius Kovesi. See KOLVESI, supra note 26, at
120. Note that this insistent attunement to context is not an invitation to legal, moral, or
political relativism. It is, however, a recognition of situatedness: We can never leap out of our
skins. Each situation, however, can and should be evaluated from a moral (realist) point of
view, which means there will be perduring concerns across cultures and over time.
34. Id. at 119.
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constitute a moral dilemma. To undermine the basic commitment to
the dignity of persons and their good, the "eliminationist party"
would likely need to undermine the above anthropological
presuppositions in the case of Jews. They would need to show that
Jews, as a group, lie outside of this category of concern and respect.
That would be a preliminary step toward creating a situation in
which the moral urgency entailed would be quite different from that
which I have thus described. The aim of the contesting parties would
be to control the description of the situation, aware that an
evaluation is imbedded in that description and that this would, in
turn, determine how people vote.
Let's return to law and economics, no longer through the lens of its
most famous practitioners but through the analyses of two friendly
critics. My goal here is to show how partial absorption of economistic
categories and presuppositions blunts the edge of critical description
from a moral point of view. This, in turn, undermines law as a form
of practical moral reasoning, or so I shall claim. I begin with my
distinguished, prolific colleague at the University of Chicago Law
School, Cass Sunstein. In Free Markets and Social Justice, Sunstein
describes law and economics as the most influential of the many
trends and developments in legal education in the last hundred years,
and he sees many advantages flowing from the economic study of
law.35 But he does have reservations, beginning with the
presuppositions about the nature of human rationality central to the
law and economics school. Sunstein queries whether or not people
can always be said to be utility-maximizers: "Sometimes people do
not seem at all rational. Sometimes they are ignorant and sometimes
they seem to defeat their own goals."36 Thus, misunderstanding
begets "irrationality." But why offer "irrationality" here as an
alternative to the rationality so cherished by econometric theory?
Cannot one rationally go against utility maximization? Doesn't the
use of "irrationality" here concede more than Sunstein may want to
concede to those he is challenging? Doesn't this unnecessarily
narrow the descriptive options?
This difficulty is compounded when Sunstein, in common with the
maximization theorists, deploys the language of preference
throughout the essays collected in his book. This creates problems
when it comes to articulating a vision of political and social life that
is separate from and much more than aggregations of preferences.
He refines the language of preference, talking of both "exogenous"
and "endogenous" preferences, but stronger terms slip through the
35. See CASS SUNSTEIN, FREE MARKETS AND SOCIAL JUSTICE (1997).
36. Id. at 4.
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cracks.37 Think, for example, of what would happen to Dr. Martin
Luther King's great speech if he had cried not "I have a dream," but
"I have a preference." The choice of a descriptive term bears within
it an alternative vision of human possibility. King's vision of an
essentially pacific democratic society, a "beloved community," was
not simply his "preference." No, that was his dream. If you try to
pack everything King covered under the rubric of "dream" into
"preference" you do damage to his ethical politics.
Let's take a second example from Sunstein's piece Social Norms
and Social Roles." His basic point-that behavior is importantly a
function of social norms and that changes in norms might be the best
way to improve individual and social well being-is unexceptionable.
But, when he characterizes government's possible role as "norm
management,"39 the civic and ethical dimension of norms start to leak
away. We are drawn away from thinking about what sorts of action
government might encourage as worthy or discourage as unworthy,
toward dealing solely with how government manages existing norms.
But the key civic question (also, necessarily, a moral one) is how we
evaluate what government is affecting and to what ends and
purposes. And this evaluation will flow from how we describe a
given situation and a government's role, or possible role, in it.
Sunstein characterizes the meaning that people attribute to their
conduct as an "expressive dimension" of behavior.' But expressivism
of this sort turns on emotivism of the epistemological sort. This is not
the way to mount a powerful account of moral notions as having a
rationally defensible cognitive base and content. So a well-
functioning society, in Sunstein's formulation, is one with many
norms that "make it rational for people, acting in their self-interest,
to solve collective action problems."'" The problem here is that
collective action itself is a problem given the premises from which
anyone indebted to the econometric school is forced to begin,
namely, the Prisoner's Dilemma, much beloved in rational choice
and utility maximizing circles. The Dilemma is a highly abstract and
extreme description of human behavior and motivation, one in which
the presupposition that we are beings driven by short-term, egoistic
thinking controls the description of the situation and militates
against any and all alternatives to such thinking. Those who know
there are alternatives-as Sunstein does-are always playing a game
of catch-up that invites overly anemic alternatives.
37. Id. at 18.
38. CASS SUNSTEIN, Social Norms and Social Roles, in FREE MARKETS AND SOCIAL
JUSTICE, supra note 35, at 32.
39. Id. at 34.
40. Id. at 45.
41. Id. at 61.
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Trying to put back in much of what econometrism takes out on the
descriptive level, Sunstein, in a "note on tragedy," describes
"tragedy" as an "individual good because it accompanies and makes
possible certain relationships and attitudes that are an important part
of a good life."42 But this sounds more like a support group than a
definition of tragedy. Tragedy is, well, tragic: a rotting, unburied
corpse and Antigone locked in mortal combat with Creon. Pity and
terror. But this sounds "irrational" from the preference-maximizing
point of view, leading one to water down one's own alternatives. The
presuppositions of law and economics have bled out robust
alternatives at their very starting point. It sounds wacky to say
Antigone is maximizing utility when she throws dirt over the rotting
corpse of her brother, Polyneices. But isn't that what econometrism,
strictly construed, would require one to say? Or, rather, that this was
an act of utter irrationality that flew in the face of any normal range
of utility maximization? Aren't these the two controlling frameworks
for describing the tragic situation with which Sophocles's Antigone
opens?43
A second example of the weakening of more robust ethical-legal
thinking through concession to econometrism can be seen in
Margaret Jane Radin's recent book, Contested Commodities.' Radin
ties herself up in conceptual knots as she both affirms and contests
the claims of commodifiers. She begins energetically: It simply is not
the case that everything has a price. 5 So excessive or "universal"
commodification must be resisted in favor of a more pragmatic
approach to contested commodities, especially those related to basic
matters touching how we think about human life itself." This is a
tricky business, she insists, because commodification, like everything
else, is a "social construction." 7 She puts Karl Marx at one end and
Gary Becker and Richard Posner at the other. How to decide? She
wants a middle way, but one that does not look like traditional
liberalism because it is problematic to claim, as some traditional
liberals have done, that there are spheres of life that should be
42. CASS SUNSTEIN, Incommensurability and Valuation in Law, in FREE MARKETS AND
SOCIAL JUSTICE, supra note 35, at 70, 102.
43. There are more points one could make, of course, including a discussion of why
efficiency is such a good thing. In urging greater democratization through law, for example,
Sunstein insists that American government could be "more effective, more efficient, and more
democratic" all at once. Id. at 318. But I have a hunch that these aims are in tension with one
another. There is no more reason, on principle, why "democratic" and "efficient" should
march in tandem than there is that markets and democracy should, if the current Chinese
system tells us anything.
44. MARGARET J. RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES (1996).
45. Id. at 9.
46. See id. at 2-6.
47. Id. at xi.
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entirely off-limits to commodification. s To her credit, Radin resists
the fungible and universally commensurable world of the
commodifiers because it cannot capture and may well "debase the
way humans value things important to human personhood."' 9 But,
given that all value is constructed by human beings, there is nothing
that simply "has value," nothing in which value inheres. So we are in
an exclusively anthropocentric universe: No value exists apart from,
or outside of, humans placing it upon objects or concepts. This
means we are unable to say that there are things, like babies, that
should never be treated as commodities.
Radin frets about selling "infants and sperm, eggs, embryos, blood,
human organs, human sexuality, human pain, human labor."' But
some organs can be sold some of the time. Here Radin takes up
arguments against "desperate exchange," like selling a kidney
because one is poor." But a ban on such exchanges may be contrary
to "respect for persons" under certain circumstances. One example
would be the sale of a kidney in a desperate situation. To prohibit
such sales entirely might add insult to injury.52 Why? Because we
might then cause the starvation of, for example, a Bangladeshi
mother who would have been able to feed her child had she been
able to sell her kidney to a wealthy purchaser in London. This is a
strange way to describe what is going on. If we say that selling organs
is a terrible but legally permissible form of commodification under
situations of desperate exchange-in effect normalizing them-we
lose the power to control the description of the situation from a
moral point of view. Instead, we are in a world of trade-offs that
would make it more difficult down the road to take a strong stand
against the need for poor women to sell their kidneys, because we
have now legitimated these sales through law.
Surely the strongest way to keep the moral point intact is to say
that it is wrong-dreadful-for kidneys in Bangladesh to go to
wealthy purchasers in the West. We must never legalize this sort of
thing. That doesn't mean we punish the desperate seller. It does
mean we would, if possible, punish mercenaries who trade in organs
for profit, something we could never do if this were a legalized set of
48. Radin does not explain in any detail what might be at stake for these "traditional
liberals" in opposing commodification in some areas of life. Radin singles out Michael Walzer
for criticism because she fears that his views, articulated in Spheres of Justice, don't suit
feminism very well. See id. at 46-49; MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE (1983). But
what is her understanding of personhood such that commodification some of the time and non-
commodification some of the time are both problematic? The answer: just another social
construction; hence, more or less arbitrary.
49. Id. at 9.
50. Id. at 21.
51. Id. at 154.
52. See id. at 159.
400
18
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities, Vol. 11, Iss. 2 [1999], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh/vol11/iss2/4
Elshtain
transactions. If we say we can do no such thing because, being decent
people, we are worried about "maldistribution of wealth"53 (Radin's
explicitly stated overarching concern) throughout the world and not
just about commodification, we tacitly promote the view that,
although we are worried about maldistribution in general, we are
willing to put aside our concerns in particular, concrete situations
and proclaim: Let them sell kidneys! This certainly isn't an outcome
Radin wants, but it is one that inevitably arises when the regime of
incomplete commodification is built on such a slippery slope that
grotesque activities are normalized descriptively and gradually lose
their capacity to shock. To say that we cannot worry about any one
thing unless we worry about everything is to fall into the excessive
universalisms associated with a kind of neo-Kantianism, the
dominant, but by no means the only, alternative to a regime of
thorough-going utilitarian reductionism.
One final example of the economistic turn and its seepage into the
discourse of even those observers who set themselves up as "critics"
occurs with the problem of baby selling. Suppose you have a poor
woman who wishes to sell a "baby on the black market" (the
example is Radin's) even as she may "wish to sell sexual services,
perhaps to provide adequately for other children or family
members."' What is wrong with these activities? For Radin, sexual
services can be commodified to a certain extent: Nothing is
inherently wrong with selling your body. But there is a problem with
baby selling because babies are not "choosing" for themselves. Baby-
selling seems like slavery for this very reason. But if this is in fact the
case, and if the heart of the matter is that babies can't choose, then
how do we justify adoption? Here babies are given away-released
for adoption-even without their consent. So, Radin continues, if we
forbid baby-selling maybe we should forbid adoption, too. If parents
are "morally entitled to give up a child,"" and if we are opposed to
slavery because that is trading in human flesh, why shouldn't we
forbid all exchanges, whether commodified or not?
Having knotted herself up in this way by setting up "choice" as the
word that does all of the descriptive (hence evaluative) work, Radin
goes on to hint that there may be one reason that adoption is
preferable to baby selling. Adoption remains lodged in a
"nonmarket version of human beings,"56 an idea that comes under
tremendous pressure whenever market discourse triumphs utterly.
This is a pretty snarled way to suggest that baby-selling is not such a
53. Id. at 154.
54. RADIN, supra note 44, at 137.
55. Id. at 139.
56. Id. at 140.
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hot idea. But the primary outcome of Radin's discussion is to cast a
pall of descriptive suspicion over adoption: It gets assimilated
conceptually to baby-selling through her use of the word "choose."
Babies cannot choose. But babies can languish, suffer from
inattention, and grow lethargic from insufficient stimulation. In other
words, babies can suffer from a well-known and named malaise that
carries all sorts of ill effects with it: non-attachment. The loving
adoption of a child is an old, tried and true way of offering homes to
children who face the prospect of no home and no family. The basis
of adoption historically was not the notion of some sort of exchange
but the notion of a gift. These are fundamentally different ways of
construing giving and receiving-one based in commodification, the
other not. This distinction is lost in Radin's discussion as she accepts
the fundamental, overriding term of liberal contractarianism and
econometrism: choice or, as the econometricians would say,
preference.
We object to baby-selling not because babies aren't exercising full
choice over the transaction but because this is a practical example of
the theory of crude substitution. Babies become just another
commodity for sale in a transnational market. Once one spells out
the difference between baby-selling and adoption in a clear way, the
lack of symmetry between them becomes overwhelmingly apparent.
Radin fuses them with the language of choice. 7 Babies don't choose
to be burnt with cigarettes, beaten to death, or starved either. But we
wouldn't say these things are bad because the baby didn't "choose"
them. We would say these things are bad, indeed viciously criminal,
because babies are persons in the most vulnerable stage of their
lives. An offense on such a person is an assault of such an egregious
sort that we will extract severe penalties for those who commit
crimes against infants. That is the way to make the point from a
moral point of view and it is a way that draws the law and ethics
together in a shared description of an event or events that has built
into it by definition a penalty. Now let's make another turn, a
feminist one.
II
As with the law and economics school, much that is engaging and
insightful has emerged with the bursting-in of feminist issues upon
the academy in general, and the law in particular ways. A few
preliminary words of introduction are needed. Feminism in the West
has always been of at least two minds about the nature of male and
female identity. Egalitarian feminists hold that there is a single
57. See id. at 137.
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human being. People may, of course, differ in temperament, abilities,
and power, but such differences must be assessed by a universal
standard. What is excellent in a man, they argue, is excellent in a
woman, and vice versa. A nefarious deed is nefarious no matter who
commits it. The problem for women historically is that men were the
paradigmatic exemplars of humanity. Most feminists insisted that
women too shared in the excellences wrongly deemed "masculine;"
hence women could not fairly be denied access to education,
property, the vote, and other civic rights." These early debates still
haunt feminism. Nearly everyone now acknowledges some notion of
difference. But difference with reference to what? The differences
being claimed or embraced, whether for purposes of sex parity or sex
privilege, do not exist "out there" as free-floating emphemera but
always involve some sort of concrete claim.
This egalitarian feminism was always challenged by an argument
from women who subscribed to a standard of "difference. ' 59 Why
accept a single human standard-and a male one at that? Is it not
only possible but even desirable that there are many human virtues,
and that women may more likely serve as exemplars of some even as
men stand for others? Perhaps valor is, in some sense, masculine
even as compassion is, in some sense, feminine. The problem for
women is that the qualities most linked to women have been
devalued overall, and male virtues were rewarded while female
virtues were ranked lower in the overall scheme of things. Such
observations offer a helpful corrective. But something problematic
happens when one moves from often keen and perceptive insights to
a thorough-going, overarching ideological agenda.
Taken to an extreme, difference begins to blot out equality and to
lay claim to privilege. It also challenges all the cumbersome rules and
regulations aimed at achieving fair play. Fairness itself comes to
seem a paltry thing by contrast with empowerment. Difference
becomes a principle, designed to trump all other principles, and
difference thus deployed is popping up everywhere. As I indicated,
one area where the argument from difference has made major
inroads is in feminist jurisprudence. But the debate has escaped the
hothouse of the law classroom and academic journals and made its
way into the courtroom, often in troubling forms that reflect one side
of a "will to power" coin. As Nietzsche himself observed, the flip
side of an urge to dominate is an urge to submit and then to construe
victimization as a claim to privilege.'
58. See, TEAN BETHKE ELSHTAIN, Battered Reason, in REAL POLITICS: AT THE CENTER
OF EVERYDAY LIFE 270, 271-73 (1997).
59. See, for example, the text that was central to re-opening this old debate, CAROL
GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT.VoicE (1982).
60. See, e.g., FRIEDRICH NIETZCHE, Essay I, On the Genealogy of Morals, in ON THE
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In the social world of radical feminist theory, women are routinely
portrayed as debased, victimized, deformed, and mutilated.61 By
construing herself as an ur-victim, the woman, in this scheme of
things, seeks to attain a paradoxical power through depictions of her
victimization. The presumption is that the victim speaks in the most
reliable voice. (And bear in mind that in this world there are only
two kinds of people: victims and oppressors.) The voice of the victim
not only gains privilege but also aspires to hegemony. Ur-victim
status is frequently part and parcel of a power play. Moreover, this
ascribed status may come to serve as one feature of a strategy of
exculpation, including evasion of responsibility for a situation or
outcome.
Consider a concrete instance, then, in which a woman is cast as
both victim and victimizer. How did the difference argument-which
seeks to preserve her victim status while simultaneously denying that
she could, as well, be held accountable for abusing or victimizing
others-play out? The primary point, for our purposes, is the power
of the descriptive language to alter or distort what we used to call the
relevant "facts" of a case. Take a 1992 case in Nashville, Tennessee.
The facts are not in dispute but the relevant descriptive schema is.
Summoned to an apartment by a man named Michael Bordis whose
infant son had "stopped breathing," metro police confronted a
horrific scene. 2 They found a thirteen-week-old baby boy in the
early stages of decomposition.' The room occupied by the
decomposing baby and his four-year-old half-brother smelled
strongly of excrement. Trash was strewn everywhere and there were
smears of feces on the walls and furniture. The filthy four-year-old
was himself hungry and underweight. It appeared he fed himself
from leavings in the refrigerator and had been left alone with the
starving infant?'
Police arrested Bordis and his wife, Claudette. She went on trial
first. According to her defense attorneys, she was the real victim.
They mounted a defense based on the "battered woman syndrome,"
an exculpatory strategy not in principle available to a male
defendant.65 Claudette Bordis could in no way be "held accountable"
for the death of her child.' Why not? Because she was in thrall to her
GENEALOGY OF MORALS AND ECCE HOMO 44-46 (Walter Kaufnan ed., R.J. Hollingdale &
Walter Kaufman trans., Vintage 1967) (1888) (discussing ressentiment).
61. For a full discussion of the ur-texts of radical feminist theory (including Brownmiller,
Daly, Firestone, and others), see JEAN BETHKE ELSHTAIN, PUBLIC MAN, PRIVATE WOMEN
201-228 (1992).
62. State v. Bordis, 905 S.W.2d 214, 216 (1995).
63. See id. at 218.
64. See id. at 217.
65. State v. Bordis, No. 91-C-1441, 1994 WL 672595, at *7 (Tenn. Crim. App.).
66. Id.
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domineering husband. Although the husband was away at work all
day, she had been so bedeviled by her subjugated status that it didn't
occur to her to feed her infant. So, the defense attorney opined, to
hold her responsible for her deeds was either a "male deal or a
prosecution deal or a society deal, but some people just don't get
it."'67 He then called one of the small army of psychologists-for-hire
available in such cases. The psychologist testified that Bordis was
"numbed out" and that this explained the fact that she neglected to
feed her son.' It also accounted for why she dressed like a prostitute
and accompanied her husband to bars, leaving the dying infant and
the four-year-old alone, in order to pick up men for three-way sexual
encounters. The final point made by the psychologist was that "our
society has conditioned women to accept that they're there to serve
men."'69 On this the defense rested. As a victim, Bordis's human
responsibilities collapsed. As a result, this diminished entity could
scarcely be held accountable for victimizing another.
The prosecutors didn't buy this, of course, and they offered a
distinction between extenuating circumstances and exculpatory
conditions. Bordis may well be a disturbed woman; indeed, evidence
suggested she was troubled long before she married her creepy
husband. But this didn't inhibit her ability to distinguish right from
wrong. She had the baby throughout the day and chose not to feed
him. Moreover, the defense's claim about Bordis's lack of agency
was an "insult to women in the community who are battered."'7 The
prosecutor told the jury that Bordis could have asked others to care
for her infant. She could have called her family. She had choices and
she opted, on some level, to destroy her infant." The jury found
Bordis guilty of first-degree murder.
What do we make of all this, and how does it connect to the heated
debate over difference? The Bordis case demonstrates how
pernicious the difference argument can become when taken to
exculpatory extremes. Instead of opening up certain areas for
examination and subjecting certain claims to critical scrutiny, the
difference argument seems here to have done the opposite. If she is a
victim, in her own definition, she cannot be held responsible.
Ironically, the argument that women are not fully responsible human
agents resurfaces in this case with a feminist gloss: The terrible facts
of the case are diminished in favor of a claim that is an artifact of a
theory that has become ideology. Once again, women seem wanting
67. Kirk Loggins, Mother Gets 15 Years For Not Protecting Sons, TENNESSEAN (Nashville),
July 9, 1992, at 5B.
68. Bordis, 1994 WL 672595, at *7.
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in what Aristotle called the deliberative faculty.' Although the
Nashville jury didn't buy it, other juries have bought a variety of
exculpatory strategies which has been used to clear women of
charges including driving to endanger, assault, child abuse, and even
murder.73 Surely, however, women cannot indefinitely have it both
ways. It is terrible to believe you are under someone's thumb. But
for a twenty-three-year-old woman with a range of options still open
to her, despite her participation in a wretched relationship, to starve
an infant to death is more terrible yet.
Notice, in light of the overriding concerns of this essay, that those
who wish to use difference as exculpation must try to control the
description of events in such a way that no space for agency, hence
accountability, remains. The perpetrator becomes a paradigmatic
victim. The second aspect of this process is to draw attention away
from the actual victim of the crime to the victim who did the deed
but who cannot be seen as morally responsible or legally culpable. So
attention must shift from a reeking, urine- and feces-strewn room
where an unfed infant body lies decomposing and his four-year-old
brother is left to fend for himself. That description evokes real pity,
even terror-a palpable moral shock. In an effort to block out the
power of moral intuitions and their open expression, we are called to
shift our attention away from that bedroom to the story of Claudette
Bordis caught in a marriage with a demanding, bossy low-life: She is
the real victim. As she sat on a couch with her decomposing infant in
the next room, the police asked her whether they could do anything
at all for her. The fact that this "victim" said, well, yeah, she'd like a
hamburger with french fries, either becomes evidence of her moral
turpitude or her "numbed out" state (or some combination thereof,
of course).
Let's move from an actual court case where certain jurisprudential
strategies and claims drawn from one version of feminism played a
key role, to a far more abstract and theoretical treatment of a
strategy of exculpation based on gender and race. Here I will parse
portions from an intensely subjective book on the law by Patricia
Williams, The Alchemy of Race and Rights.74 Williams is an
enthusiastic proponent of the so-called subject position school many
feminists and "crit" theorists in general have embraced. Roughly put,
72. See ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS 34-36 (Ernest Barker ed. & trans., Oxford Univ. Press
1962).
73. See Anne M. Coughlin, Excusing Women, 82 CALIF. L. REv. 1, 55 & n.274; see
generally WOMEN'S FREEDOM NETWORK, FROM DATA TO PUBLIC POLICY: AFFIRMATIVE
ACTION, SEXUAL HARASSMENT, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, AND SOCIAL WELFARE (Rita J.
Simon ed., 1996).
74. PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS (1991); see also Jean
Bethke Elshtain, Alchemy and the Law, 25 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1171 (1992) (book review).
24
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities, Vol. 11, Iss. 2 [1999], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh/vol11/iss2/4
Elshtain
subject position thinkers hold that everything looks as it does to me
due to my "subject position." The same holds for you and everybody
else. One winds up with "You have your truth, and I've got mine."
By definition this school is hostile to the aspirations of law itself as "a
distinct context for human knowing."75 For Williams, "[the] subject
position is everything,"76 and there is nothing distinctive at all about
the law. Those who operate from the subject position school
embrace, whether openly or tacitly, a thesis of incommensurability.
Therefore, it is unsurprising that Williams treats those who disagree
with her as racial and political suspects; disagreement can only arrive
via the dubious transport of narrow interest or false-consciousness.
The upshot is that authentic exchange and dialogue become
impossible and that any text, or exchange, or encounter, or piece of
evidence means whatever Williams takes it to mean. Unsurprisingly,
she takes a sledgehammer to tests of reasonableness and the burden
of proof in the law.
For Williams, Anglo-American jurisprudence is cold and abstract,
dominated by the "hypostatization of exclusive categories and
definitional polarities" and by the "existence of transcendent,
acontextual, universal legal truths or pure procedures."77 By contrast
she offers first-person privilege--my experience, my subject
position-as if that in itself yielded the indisputable truth of the
matter. Men are charged with particular sins of emotionlessness and
impersonality, of something called "men's ways of knowing.
'" 78
Williams's subject position is apparently not pierced by the irony
that dividing knowing into male and female approaches is one of the
crudest bipolarities or dichotomies one could possibly imagine.79
Most interesting for our purposes are Williams's attacks on the law
from the "difference" standpoint. She begins with a particularly ugly
ideology: All whites despise all blacks, consciously or not. So the
very "essence" of blackness is to be defamed, to be a victim. From
this, she goes on to discuss a number of cases, including the Tawana
Brawley incident.' In her discussion, Williams ignores or dismisses
the empirical realities and evidence of this case.
Let's recall the facts."' In 1987, Tawana Brawley, a fifteen-year-old
75. Mark G. Yudof, "Tea at the Palaz of Hoon": The Human Voice in Legal Rules, 66 TEx.
L. REV. 589, 590 (1988).
76. WILLIAMS, supra note 74, at 3.
77. Id. at 8.
78. Id. at 13.
79. The fact that Martin Luther King, John Stuart Mill, and Adolf Hitler and Mahatma
Gandhi were all men and each seems to have reasoned rather differently doesn't compute in
Williams's universe.
80. See WILLIAMS, supra note 74, at 169-78.
81. For a full discussion of the intricacies of this case drawn from contemporary news
accounts, interviews with the protagonists, and other primary materials, see JIM SLEEPER, THE
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black girl, claimed she had been kidnapped and raped by a white
gang.' She alleged that some members of the gang had been law
enforcement officers, including Dutchess County Assistant District
Attorney Steven Pagones, who recently was vindicated in a lawsuit
against his chief tormentersY The charges turned out to be part of an
elaborate hoax. Brawley appears to have started the story itself to
cover up, or to avoid, a messy personal and family situation. Her
story was taken up by militants and turned into a symbolic affair that
was somehow "true" even if the story was a hoax and the specific
charges were entirely false. ' In her discussion of the Brawley case,
Williams does acknowledge the manipulation of Brawley by her
handlers. But she cannot bring herself to admit the depth of the hoax
and the extent of real harm (including an apparent suicide) that was
suffered by those falsely and cynically accused. For Williams, the
facts literally can be damned. Even if Brawley fabricated the whole
story and injured herself, "her condition was clearly the expression
of some crime against her, some tremendous violence, some great
violation that challenges comprehension. And this is much that I
grieve about."' Brawley may not have been an actual victim of real
men who actually did the things alleged in the hoax. Nonetheless,
Williams claims that Brawley was the victim of a "metarape."' This
is a pernicious argument. Should we send men to jail for "meta-
crimes" because they presumably harbor the animus Williams claims
lurks in the hearts of every non-black? This is reminiscent of the old
Marxist canard concerning "objective class enemies": One needn't
have done anything wrong to be slated for punishment, even
elimination. Williams seems untroubled by her conclusion that even
if no particular person has done any concrete harm to any particular
African-American, on the basis of all the evidence, they are
nonetheless guilty on the "meta" level.
For Williams, evidentiary rules are merely one way those engaged
in turf wars mark their territory. After all, the need for proof is very
burdensome. Of course, the entire tradition of "innocent until
proven guilty" assumes that proof must be burdensome to prevent
hasty convictions. The burden of proof is designed to protect those
who lack coercive power from the caprice of those who have it and
are prepared to use it. Williams dismisses this pesky feature of the
common law tradition by declaring that "social life is based primarily
CLOSEST OF STRANGERS (1990).
82. See id. at 8.
83. See, e.g., Kimberley Mills, New York Jury Sees to It That Justice Is Done, SEATrLE
POST-INTELLIGENCER, Aug. 2, 1998, at E2.
84. See SLEEPER, supra note 81, at 203-07.
85. WILLIAMS, supra note 74, at 170.
86. Id. at 176.
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on the imaginary" in any caseY Instead, we must place our faith in a
true self, rather than rules, procedures, and standards of fair play.
All standards are nothing but "socially accepted subjective
preferences."' Here Williams's form of subject position/feminist/
post-modern/difference discourse shakes hands with law and
economics by reducing human choices to preferences. Whatever
"feels" true (like meta-rapes, presumably) is treated as true. For
example, Williams supports affirmative action because it is a
"mystical and beyond-the-self" sort of thingY Mystical? Beyond-the-
self? It is a public policy. How can one even begin to discuss it
intelligibly if it is "beyond-the-self"?
Williams, in a particularly extreme way, shares a widespread and
generalized tendency in feminist legal discourse to contrast rules and
laws with the assumption that "the human voice is natural and
genuine-the 'real thing' - and that formal rules and doctrines are
contrived, artificial, and heedless of the human experience of the
parties."' But as Mark Yudof insists,
[the] urge to conceptualize and to generalize is as "natural" as
the urge to be concrete and to speak in ordinary human
terms .... I believe that conceptualization and ordering are
natural, indeed inherent in the human voice, which can be heard
or can exist only through a mental structuring of experience.
This contrast between a feeling, intuitive, and therefore authentic
self and cold mechanisms or "formal" structures is not only wrong as
a characterization of human mental activities, but also politically
pernicious and legally dangerous. If we strip away rules and evidence
and the "burden of proof," we are left with caprice, which creates
openings for more, not less, coercive and naked force. If difference is
deployed to destroy moral agency and create epistemological - even
ontological-incorrigibility, we may as well slam shut the law books.
III
I will end with a further elaboration and defense of law's intrinsic
moral features that can (as we have seen) be obliterated by the
construction of comprehensive theories and ideological claims. Law
concerns people in their concreteness. It speaks to this moment, that
event, that body, that person holding a gun. It also speaks to our
highest aspirations for human decency and right, concepts that
87. Id. at 63.
88. Id. at 99.
89. Id. at 50.
90. Yudof, supra note 75, at 519.
91. Id. at 592.
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concern not metaphorical persons but the flesh and blood human
beings with whom we share this fragile globe. Human rights is about
blood and bones and rotting corpses. Theories of human rights
should speak directly to such realities and identify ways to prevent
them. Particular events and general principles and commitments
need stitching together.
I propose that this is most effectively achieved through our
description of a situation. For example, suppose a group of persons is
gathered around listening to a description of a brutal event in which
young children are systematically tortured by sadistic adults. The
account is replete with details of the desperate implorings of the
children and the impervious cruelty of their torturers. One listener is
devoted to a sharp bifurcation between description and evaluation.
He turns to the group and says, "Well now, how should we think
about whether we approve or not of the actions of these torturers?"
This is a completely unnecessary question. The description I just
offered includes all that is necessary for a condemnation- brutal,
sadistic torturers and suffering children. The description of events
constitutes an evaluation from a moral point of view. (And, needless
to say, legal implications flow directly from this description framed
from the moral point of view.) A person devoid of a moral
perspective would have described these events in different language.
To repeat: There is simply no such thing as a "neutral" language of
description; rather, we evaluate the world through our descriptions
of it. In Julius Kovesi's words, "moral notions describe the world of
evaluation."' This helps us to understand why nations and armies
and others in power strive so mightily to control the description of
what is going on, especially in situations of conflict. The judgments
internal to acts of moral evaluation turn precisely on what one
considers the relevant facts of a situation.
So the law remains a primary area within which description from a
moral point of view goes forward, with the additional burden that
the description must meet certain standards of believability,
reasonableness, and so on. One's descriptions are never
unconstrained. One can't just unleash them willy-nilly. The
obligation of law as a form of moral reasoning is to take up all the
relevant facts (insofar as these can possibly be known), which in turn
will always be imbedded in some evaluative framework or another.
And this framework isn't articulated on a meta-level but imbedded
within the choice of a language of description. The relevant facts and
the evaluations that flow from them "not only have to be formed
from the point of view of anyone, but they also have to be about
92. KovEsi, supra note 26, at 161.
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those features of our lives that can be the features of anyone's life."93
Here a reminder about my example of the relevance of
situatedness - that voting in a by-year election in a well-off, peaceful,
civically well-run republic dominated by interest group politics, and
voting in a situation in which one of the parties is dedicated to the
wholesale elimination of an entire class of human beings will carry
quite different moral meanings. Moreover, these different moral
meanings will be borne along by the description of the situation.
This isn't nearly so mysterious as it may seem at first blush. My
final example will be drawn from the great film classic, To Kill a
Mockingbird.94 I will assume some familiarity with Harper Lee's
story. We are now in the courtroom for the trial of Tom Robinson, a
good man, but a good black man. His blackness, his being, is the only
relevant factor for the prosecution by those we unkindly call "white
trash"-a poor, uneducated, roughed-up young woman and her foul-
mouthed, heavy-drinking father. Atticus Finch, assigned to defend
Tom Robinson, is doing so to the best of his ability by ferreting out
all the relevant facts in the case: circumstantial evidence, character
evidence (is this behavior in any way consistent with what we know
about this man?) and so on. The female accuser's testimony is pitted
against Finch's attempt to impeach it. It is established beyond a
reasonable doubt that the female accuser was beaten severely on the
right side of her head and over her right eye. She also was gagged
around her neck, with finger imprints on both sides of the back of
her throat.
Finch, in a quiet gesture, asks the violent father of the accuser to
write out his name, thereby establishing that he writes using his left
hand; indeed, that he leads with his left. By contrast, when Finch
throws an empty drinking glass in Tom Robinson's direction, he can
only catch it with his good right arm, as his withered left arm had
been caught in a cotton gin when he was a child. Whoever beat up
the accuser led with his left. That eliminates the accused and makes
the father the prime suspect. Robinson's own testimony is rich in
detail, helping us to appreciate the entire train of events that led up
to this dreadful moment in court: He is following his oath to tell the
whole truth as he knows it. Finch, in his closing remarks to the jury,
insists that this is a case that should never have been brought to trial,
as not one iota of corroborative evidence that the crime ever
happened has been proffered.
Recall now the perspective I have been developing. Recall that
one of the most pressing of all moral acts is deciding what is to count
as a relevant fact in any situation. In everyday discussion, outside this
93. Id. at 148.
94. To KILL A MOCKINGBIRD (Universal 1962).
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courtroom situation, the fact that Robinson cannot use his left arm
might be a matter of concern, pity, or curiosity. In this courtroom
context, it is a fact of the most profoundly and deeply moral sort:
The body cannot lie. One arm is usable, the other not. The arm that
is useless is the arm that, on another man, harmed the accused.
Knowing these descriptive facts, along with others that exculpate the
defendant, yields an evaluation: not guilty.'
In his closing comments to the jury, Finch calls it an evil
assumption that all Negroes lie, that Negro men cannot be trusted
with white women, and so on. He is trying to counter those evil
assumptions with a few basic, humble facts that add up to a moral
point of view and, in this, he insists that the courts are our great
levelers. This, he concludes, is no ideal, but rather a living, breathing
reality. I submit that we would not want to live in a world in which
Robinson's withered left arm lacked compelling force within the
context of a courtroom in which it is precisely that physical fact that
carries the moral and legal argument. The jurors in To Kill a
Mockingbird know they are overriding a moral fact in favor of
conformity to a tradition dictating that everything a white person
says overrides anything a black person says, even if one is obviously
lying and the other telling the truth.
If we determine that Robinson's arm is without compelling force,
we are left to adjudicate between two sets of subjective claims that
we accept or not depending on our subject position. The implications
of a tendency to favor self-replicating and self-generating
constructions over palpable material evidence is dire. As Hannah
Arendt puts it in her great work, The Origins of Totalitarianism,
"[t]he ideal subject of totalitarian rule is not the convinced Nazi or
the convinced Communist, but people for whom the distinction
between fact and fiction... and the distinction between true and
false.., no longer exist."'  Coming to articulate the moral
forcefulness of the left arm is part of a moral transformation through
which persons are capable of moving and, in so doing, drawing closer
to the truths that moral realism discloses to us or insists can, in
principle, be revealed. I realize, of course, that the analytic burden of
this paper has been primarily, if not exclusively, deconstructive
rather than constructive. Were I to build on this piece, having
cleared some brush (so to speak), it would be necessary for me to
grapple with some tough cases that would further illustrate the
clarity and power of moral realism as a basis for legal thought and
95. Tom is found guilty in the film, of course, given the South of that time and the racial
prejudice that prevailed. Atticus predicts they have a good chance on appeal with the facts in
their favor, but Tom is killed trying to escape before the appeal can proceed.
96. HANNAH ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM 474 (1973).
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action. This constructive task cannot be an abstract one in which I
conjure up "tough cases" for myself; rather, it must stay close to the
ground of law as practiced. It would be a terrible irony if an
argument calling for recognition of the moral force of relevant facts
became so abstract that what one wanted to elucidate one had, in
fact, obscured.
If racial, sexual, gender, or other generic categories are deployed
to obfuscate rather than illuminate the fact of the matter, one falls
into the "evil system" Finch denounces. No matter whose ox is being
gored. No matter whose interest is being served. No matter what
"Big Picture" may be at stake. That is the moral power of the law as
a form of reason and as a practice. So we can say something more
about the jurors in To Kill a Mockingbird. We can say that if they
had accepted the truth of Robinson's withered arm, that truth would
have set them free. If we run an alternative ending to the story-a
not-guilty verdict-we can discern its electrifying and transformative
potential. For in the recognition of that humble fact lay freedom.
That the jurors refused this freedom is, perhaps, no surprise. But it is
a refusal. They declined an invitation to live in the truth.7
97. This turn of phrase is associated with the life and work of President Viclav Havel. See,
e.g., VAcLAv HAVEL, LIVING IN TRUTH (1987).
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